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A Court of Equity should 
decide all issues involved. 
A Court of Equity should 
impress a lien on the 
common estate to secure · 
a co tenant who has ad-
vanced money to pay taxes, 
discharge encumbrances or 
make improvements. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N. B. ROGERS HELMAN, forinerly 
known and being one and the same 
person as N. B. Rogers, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
W. C. P XTERSON, ASA LL.OYD 
HEFLIN, MEL.VIN C. BO·WL·E:S, 
FIRST DOE, SECOND D'OE, 
THIRD DOE, and FOURTH DOE, 
Defendavnts and Appellant·s. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMEN:T OF F AC·Ts 
Case No. 
7552 
Plaintiff commenced this proceeding to quiet title 
to an undivided one-half interest in certain unpatented 
mining claims situate in San Juan County, Utah, and 
more particularly described in the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The Comp~laint further alleged that the Defendant has 
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entered upon said mining :claims, mined ore therefrom, 
and the prayer of the ·Complaint, inter alia, asks for 
injunctive relief. However, no damages were asked for, 
and no restraining order was ever issued and no further 
reference will be made to this phase of the case. (R. 
37-58) 
The defendant, W. C. Paterson, filed an answer in 
which he admitted that said mining claims were recorded 
as alleged, that he claimed an interest in said mining 
claims adverse to the claims of the Plaintiff and denied 
each and every other allegation of the Complaint. The 
De~endant's answer alleged as. an .affirmative defense 
and cross-complaint that he was the sole owner of the 
le~gal and possessary title to said mining claims and 
entitle9. to the possession thereof, subject only to a lease-
hold interest of the Defendants, Heflin and Bowles. (R. 
32-34) 
The answer further alleged that on May 21, 1949, the 
D·e.fendant entered into- an option agreement with the 
Plaintiff under the terms of which the Defendant offered 
to sell some of the mining claims desc'ribed in the Plain-
tiff's Complaint, but said agreement was never exer:cised, 
consumated or fulfilled, and that on October 4, 1949, the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into an agreement 
under the terms of which the Plaintiff agreed to buy and 
the Defendant agreed to sell all of the mining claims 
described in the Complaint for the sum of $25,000.00, that 
the Plaintiff failed to make payments as provided in 
said agreement and the Defendant has ·cancelled said 
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agreement, and by reason of thes·e agreements, the Plain-
tiff is estopped to deny title of the Defendant to said 
mining claims. The District 'Court resolved this issue 
in favor of the Plantiff and since no error is p·redicated 
upon the Court's decision in this regard, no further 
reference will be made to this pleaded estop·pel. (R. 32-
34) 
·The p~rayer of the Defendant's answer and cross-
complaint prayed that title to the said mining claims be 
quieted in the Defendant, that the claims of the Plaintiff 
be declared to be invalid and of no force and effect what-
ever, and that Plaintiff be restrained ·and enjoined from 
asserting any title to said mining claims and for such 
further relief as is meet and equitable in the premises. 
(R. '32-34) 
'The District Court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree quieting title in the 
Plaintiff to an undivided one-half interest in said min-
ing claims. (R. 14-19) Neither the District Court's Find-
ings of Fact nor Conclusions of Law nor Decree makes 
any reference whatsoever to the title to the undivided 
one-half interest which was not quieted in the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant filed a timely motion to amend the 
Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Deeree 
which, so far as they are pertinent to this ap})·eal, re-
quested the Court to modify paragraph 3 of said Find-
ings of Fact by setting forth therein that the Defendant .. 
had not only rendered services in connection with the 
acquisition of said mining claims, but that said Defend-
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ant had paid out of his own resources toward the pur-
chase price and development of said mining claims the 
sum of $16,000.00, and had made, exe.cuted and delivered 
to the seller, Howard Balsley, his note in the amount of 
$2,250.00, and secured said note with a good and suffi-
cient mortgage upon said mining claims and that the 
Plaintiff had contributed only $4,000.00 toward the pur-
chase price and improvements of said mining claims. 
That their -contributions were not joint and equal and 
that in equity and good conscience, the right, title and 
interest of the Plaintiff and of the Defendant, Paterson, 
should be quieted in each in proportion to their respe(}-
tive contributions toward the purchase price and costs 
of development of said mining 'claims, or in the alterna-
tive, to quiet title to an undivided one-half interest in 
the Plaintiff and that Plaintiff pay and contribute to 
the Defendant, Paterson, toward the cost of purchase 
and development of said mining claims an amount which 
would make their respective contributions equal. The 
motion further moved the Court to adjust all equities 
between the parties to the action and to determine the 
status of all controversial claims to or interest in the 
properties which are shown to exist in the evidence, re-
gardless of the character. (R. 20-21). This motion was 
denied. ( R. 10) 
At the trial of the ease, it was stipulated and agreed 
hy the Plaintiff and the Defendant, Paterson, that the 
lease-hold interest of the Defendants Asa Lloyd Heflin 
and Melvin C. Bowles would not be affected by the out-
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come of this litigation and the decree entered by Judge 
Keller so recites. :Therefore no further mention will be 
made to the interest of said Defendants. (Tr. 3) 
During the fall of 1947, Plaintiff and Defendant 
entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiff was to 
furnish services in the procurement of capital and De-
fendant was to furnish services in finding, selecting and 
acquiring certain mining claims to be purchased and 
developed through the capital furnished by Plaintiff. 
(R. 17; Tr. 5-6) 
In accordance with said agreement, the Plaintiff 
procured investors in the vicinity of Kansas City and 
Topeka, Kansas, and delivered to the Defendant the 
sum of $~9,550.00; that the Defendant exp·ended $37,310.-
00 for the purchase of certain mining claims situate in 
the State qf Colorado and.11 mining claims situate near 
Moab, Utah, none of which are involved in this action, 
and for expenses incurred in connection with the acquisi-
tion and w·ork done on these claims. This evidence is 
uncontradicted and the details of these expenditures 
are set out in the D·efendant's Exhibit B. 
In accordance with said agree~ent, on June 1, 1948, 
the Defendant in his individual capacity and as agent 
for the Plaintiff entered into an agreement with H. W. 
Balsley under the terms of which Mr. Balsley agreed to 
sell and the Defendant agreed to buy the mining claims 
described in Plaintiff's Complaint for $20,000.00 pay-
able according to the terms and p·rovisions of said agree-
ment. (Defendant's Exhibit C). 
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Payments were made from time to time to Mr. 
Balsley and as of July 14, 1949', there had been paid to-
ward the purchase price of said mining claims the sum 
of $15,500.00. On June 15, 1949, the Defendant paid 
an additional $2,2'50.00 and at the same time made, 
executed and delivered to Mr. Balsley his ~promissory 
note in the amount of $2.,250.00 and secured said note 
with a mortgage upon said mining claims, so that after 
the June 15, 1949 payment, the Defendant had paid 
$17,750.00 in cash and had delivered a note and mortgage 
to secure the balance of the purchase price to-wit: 
$2,250.00. ·Of the $17,750.00 so paid, the Defendant paid 
out of his personal funds $13,750.00 and /$4,000.00 out of 
a joint fund owned by the Plaintiff and the Defendant in 
equal shares so that the actual contribution of the De-
fendant toward the purchase price of said claims was 
$15,750.00 and the contribution of the Plaintiff toward 
the purchase of said mining claims was $2,000.00. These 
facts are not contradicted and the amount of the various 
payments made by the Defendant to Mr. Balsley and the 
source of such funds are set out in Defendant's Exhibit 
H. 
STA'TEMENT OF POINTS 
1. ·The District Court erred in the following par-
ticulars to-wit : 
(a) In denying the Defendant's motion to amend 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and De'cree and 
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refusing to determine the Defendant's interest in said 
mining claims. 
(b) In denying the Defendant's motion to amend 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and refusing to 
determine the amount of the contributions of the Plain-
tiff and the Defendant toward the purchase p,rice and 
costs of improving· said mining claims. 
(c) In denying the Defendant's motion to amend 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions o'f Law and re-
fusing either to quiet title to an undivided one-half in-
terest in the Plaintiff and an undivided one-half interest 
in the Defendant and to impose a lien upon said mining 
claims to secure the ·payment of contribution by the Plain-
tiff to the Defendant for such an amount as would make 
their contributions equal, or in the alternative, to quiet 
the title in the parties in undivided fractional interests 
proportioned upon their resp,ective contributions in the 
acquisition and development of the claims. 
(d) In refusing to adjudicate the relative rights, 
obligations and liabilities of the Plaintiff in regard to 
the note and mortgage against said mining claims in 
favor of said H. W. Balsley. 
(e) In refusing to require the Plaintiff to do equity, 
and in refusing to make a complete disposition of all 
the issues raised by the Complaint, Ansvrer, and Cross-
Complaint. 
2. The District Court erred in denying the De-
fendant's. motion to amend its Findings of Fact by 
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striking from paragraph 2 of said Findings of Fact the 
following: 
''And that the other half would be finally 
transferred to said Corporation and that the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant W. C. Paterson would 
receive stock for their transfer and other compen-
sation for their services, and that the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant W. C. P'aterson would each 
own a one-fourth interest in such property so 
acquired.'' 
ARGUMENT 
A COURT OF EQUITY SH~OULD NOT ENT.ER AN IN-
COMPLETE DECREE, BUT SHOULD DECIDE ALL ISSUES 
INVOLVED IN THE CONTROVERSY AND AWARD COM-
PLETE RELIEF AND ACCOMPLISH FULL JUSTICE BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES TO PREVENT FURTHER LITIGA-
TI·ON. 
liu.dlow, et al, vs. Colorado Animal By-
Products Company, Utah 1943 104 Utah 
121137 P. (2), 347. 
Kinsmam vs. Utah Gas and Coke Company, 
Utah, 1918 53 Utah 10: 177 P. 419. 
Floor vs. Johnson, Utah, 1948, not reported 
199 P. (2) 547. 
Stromerson vs. Averill, California, 1942, 121 
P. (2) 826; 126 P. (2) 392; 141 P. (2) 
732; 1'33 P. (2) 617. 
Hu,ltz vs. Taylor, Kansas 1947, 181 P. (2) 515. 
Mur'nay Hotel OompaJYIJY vs. Go1lditng et aJ, 
New Mexico, 1950, 216 P. (2) 3164. 
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Bacon vs. Wahrhaftig, California, 1950, 218 
P. (2) 144. 
LaJolla Casa Deman.ana vs. Hopkins, Cali-
forni~a, 1950, 219 P. ( 2) 871. 
Colombia Trust Ciomp1any vs. Farmers & 
Merchants Bnnk, Utah, 1933, 82 Ut'ah 
117 22 P. (2) 164. 
Conley vs. Sharpe, California, 1943, 136 P. 
(2) 376. 
Strausburg vs. Connor, California, 19'50, 215 
P. (2) 509. 
Miller vs. Gillelamd, Colorado, 19'39, 95 P. (2) 
815. 
Ut~ah Rules of Civil Procedu.re, Rule 54(c) 1. 
Rule 54 (c) provides : 
"Generally. Excep~t as to a party against 
whon1 a judgment is entered by default, every 
_ final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief 
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against 
one or more of several claimants; and it may, 
when the justice of the case requires it, determine 
the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves.'' 
In Ludlow vs. Colorado Animal By-Prodtt.cts Com-
pa;ny, supra, suit was brought to enjoin the construction 
and operation of the Defendant's Rendering Plant upon 
the ground that it consituted a nuisance. The District 
Court found that the Plant constituted a nuisance, but in 
view of the Plaintiff's delay in seeking relief, no injunc-
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tion would be granted, but that the Plaintiffs would he 
awarded damages for the depreciation of the value of 
their property by reason of the maintenance of the 
nuisance. Thereafter, a suppJemental Complaint was 
filed in which p~arties, as to whom the action had pre-
vi·ously been dismissed, were joined as Plaintiffs. Com-
plaint was made that the supplemental pleading is an 
action in which there was a mis·joinder of parties Plain-
tiff, each having a separate cause of action for damages. 
The Supreme Court held that it was not error to 
permit the suppJemental pleadings, and in its opinion 
said: 
''In an equity action where the prayer is for 
both specific and general relief, such as for an 
injunction and 'any further or other relief which 
the Court shall deem appropriate in the premises,' 
having once acquired jurisdiction of the parties 
and the subject matter, the Court will retain that 
jurisdiction until full justice has been achieved 
between the parties, even if equitable relief is 
denied. ·This is especially true in this state where 
we have only one form of civil action, and various 
kinds of relief can be administered in the same 
action.'' 
In the Floor vs. J ohns,on, supra, suit was brought 
by certain stockholders of the New Quincy Mining Com-
p·any to cancel two hundred thousand shares of stock 
which had been issued by the ·Company. By amendment, 
the respondent asked for additional relief in the ouster 
of the Directors who had been elected by stockholders 
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including those representing the two hundred thousand 
shares in question. 
The Court held that the two hundred thousand 
shares of stock had been fraudulently issued, and de-
creed that the Directors- elected by virtue of the use of 
that stock were holding ·office illegally. Comp~laint was 
made by the Defendants, that the Court had no authority 
to declare the Directors ·who had fraudulently issued the 
stock to be illegally elected. In its ·opinion the ·Court said: 
''It would be a peculiar kind of justice if the 
equity court were only able to say the stock was 
fraudulently issued and order its cancellation, 
and then be unable to give the complete relief 
which would naturally foll·ow, of declaring the 
legality or illegality of action pursuant to the 
fraudulent issue. Schwab vs. Frisco Mining Mill-
ing Co., supra, and cases cited therein. 'The ouster 
of the Johnson group and declaration that the 
Floor group members were elected is not the 
·paramount relief sought. It is only incidental to 
the cancellation of stock fraudulently issued, ~and 
outstanding. Consolidated Wagon & 1\fachine ·Co. 
v. Kay et al., 81 Utah 595, 21 P. 2d 836; ·Trenchard 
v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P. 1046; Kinsman v. Utah 
Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 P. 418. There was 
no error in overruling the demurrers and 'Objec-
tions rn-ade to inclusion of the additional matters 
in the p~rayer for relief." -
In Kinsmam vs. The Ubah Gas and Coke Com.p,any, 
supra, the C·ourt following the same rule, said: 
"The Plaintiffs alleged the depreciation of 
both the rental and market value of their homes, 
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and the court found that such allegations were 
supported by the testimony. Plaintiffs prayed for 
both specific and general relief, and a court of 
equity, having acquired jurisdiction of the parties 
and the subject-matter, will retain that juris-
diction until justice has been done between the 
parties. 
''In addition, in this state there is but one 
form of civil action for the enforcement or pro-
tection of private rights and for the redress or 
prevention of private wrongs, and law and equity 
may be administered in the same action. Such 
are the provisions of both the Constitution and the 
Code. ·To dismiss this action, and send the Plain-
tiffs to their actions at law, would necessitate the 
filing of new complaints based upon and contain-
ing the same facts as alleged in the com·plaint 
here, and to be presented to the same court, in-
vested with like powers. Such proceedings would 
defeat the very object of the Constitutional and 
statutory provisions providing for only one form 
of civil action, and empowering the court to ad-
minister both equity and legal relief in the same 
action.'' 
Strom.erson v. Averill, supra, is a ~ost interesting 
and enlightening case. Four times the Superior Court of 
California entered a judgment and an ap·peal was taken, 
and four times the Supreme Court of ~California held 
that the Su:perior Court had not determined all of the 
issues involved in the case and had not required the 
Defendant to do equity. 
In 1936, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with 
Miller and Lux, Inc. to purchase 5162 acres of land. Pay-
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ments were to be made as set out in the contract over a 
period of nine years. The down payment was made 
through a loan obtained by the Defendant, most of which 
was repaid out of the operations of the farm. The farm 
operations were financed ·by advances from the San 
Joaquin Cotton 'Oil Company, secured by chattel mort-
gages on the crops. Such notes and mortgages were 
endorsed by the Defendant. Such advances were repaid 
chiefly by returns of the crops raised. ·Three bank ac-
counts were maintained and the advances raised from 
the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company were paid into 
such of these accounts as the circumstances required. 
Plaintiff brought an action to quiet title. Defendant 
answered alleging ownership. 
The Superior Court of 'California found that the 
Plaintiff was working as agent 'Of the Defendant and 
quieted title to said real estate in the Defendant. Upon 
appeal the Supreme Court of ·California reversed the 
Superior Court for failing to determine all of the issues 
raised by the pleadings and in failing to require the 
Defendant to do equity. In its opinion 133 P. (2') 62.5 the 
Court said: 
"We agree with Plaintiffs that the Court has 
failed to require Defendant to do equity in the 
case and further proceedings should be had. The 
nature of the action has been heretofore discussed. 
Such cases as this should ·not be tried piecemeal. 
The entire issue between the parties should be ad-
justed. As it stands, Stromerson assumed per-
sonal liability under the contract to purchase the. 
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prop·erty. If Defendant does not discharge the 
obligation, it is shouldered upon Stromerson, De-
fendant's agent. Fur:ther, it appears that there 
may be outstanding notes and chattel mortgages 
upon which Stromerson is liable in connection 
with his conduct as an agent for D·efendant, and 
the court made no finding with respect to the 
financial obligations, if any, existing between the 
parties. As we have seen, the decree determines 
that the contract and property belong to Defend-
ant and that Stromerson has no interest therein. 
It rests upon theory of agency and a constructive 
or resulting trust arising therefrom. There neces-
sarily was implicit in the agency agreement an 
agreement upon the part of the Defendant, princi-
pal to reimburse the agent Stromerson for any 
detriment suffered by him in carrying out his 
duties. It is the general rule that unless otherwise 
agreed, the princip~al owes a duty to his agent to 
reimburse him for or exonerate him from author-
ized payments by the agent on behalf of the princi-
pal, and payments and obligations under contracts 
\vhich the agent is authorized _to make himself 
liable. Schwarting v. Artle 40 Cal. App. 2d 433, 
105 P. 2d 380; Dolman 'Co. Inc. v. Rubber Corpora-
tion of America, 109 Cal. App. 353, 293 P. 129; 
Restatement Agency 439. It does not appear that 
there wa.s ·any agreement between defendant and 
Stromerson that the former was not to exonerate 
the latter from -or reimburse him for obligations 
incurred by the latter on behalf of the former, but 
on the contrary the circumstances point to an 
implied agreement that such exoneration and 
reimbursement would he made. Also, where the 
resulting or constructive trustee takes title with 
the consent of the beneficiary he is entitled to 
reimbursement. ·S~ee Watson v. Poore, supra; 
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Robles v. Clarke, 25 ·Cal. 317; Woodard v. 
Wright, 82 Cal. 202, 22 P. 1118; Milloglav v. 
Zacharias, 33 Cal. App. 561, 165 P. 977. The con-
duct of Stromerson in giving .his personal credit 
on the contract and the crop mortgages was at 
the direction of the Defendant, his p~rincip·al. He 
may also have rendered services and made ex-
penditures for which he has not been reimbursed. 
The trial court should therefore take an account-
ing, asC€rtain the nature and extent of the out-
standing obligations which Stromerson has as-
sumed, the value of any services he has rendered 
and the amount of any expenditures he h·as made 
in the course of his duties as agent for Defend-
ant including the contract of purchase, and make 
such order in the premises as a condition to De-
fendant's recovery as will protect Plaintiffs from 
liability under those obligations and reimburse 
them for such services and expenditures if any. 
''The judgment is reversed and the cause re-
manded to the trial court to take such further 
proceedings as may be necessary to determine 
what if any obligations Plaintiffs or either of 
them have assum·ed as agent OT trustee f·or De-
fendant, and any amounts due from Defendant to 
Plaintiffs or either of them arising out of the 
transaction in relation to the acquisition, de-
velopment or 'Operation of the property involved 
in this action, and render judgment accordingly, 
making any amount due Plaintiffs a lien upon 
Defendant's interest in said property, and provid-
ing for the release, discharge and exoneration of 
Plaintiffs and each of them from any 'obligations 
in connection with the purchase, develop·m·ent or 
operation of said property, and thereupon make 
a decree quieting Defendant's title to said prop·-
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erty subject to the payment of such lien and the 
discharge of said obligations by Defendant.'' 
·see also 141 P. (2:) 737 where the California Court 
. again reversed the Superior Court for failure to deter-
mine all of the issues. 
A CO-TENANT WHO PAYS T·HE TAXES AGAINST THE 
COMMON ESTATE OR MAKES SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVE-
MENTS IN THE COMM·ON ESTATE, OR DISCHARGES A 
PRIOR AND SUPERIOR ENCUMBRANCE IS ENTITLED TO 
CONTRIBUTION FROM THE OTHER CO-TENANTS, AND 
T·O A LIEN AGAINST THE COMMON ESTATE TO SECURE 
SU,CH ·CONTRIBUTIO·NS. 
Hultz v. Taylolf, Kansas 1947, 181 P. (2) 515; 
199 P. (2) 52:9; 215 P. (2) 145 
Con.ley v. Slvarpe, California, 1943, 13'6 P. (2) 
376 
Strarusburg v. Co'Yllfl.or, California, 1950, 215 
P. (2) 509 
In Hultz v. Tay~or, 181 P. (2) 515, the Plaintiff 
commenced an action to require the Defendant to convey 
to. the Plaintiff 15 acres of a 30 acre tract of land. The 
Defendant answered that he was the owner of all said 
30 acres and that he was in possession thereof. The -trial 
court held that the Plaintiff had not sustained the burden 
of proof to his claim of ownership and that the Defend-
ant had not sustained the burden of proof to his claim of 
ownership. The Court further held that if a request for 
partition was made by either party, the property would 
be partitioned and the proceedings of the sale distributed 
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according to the contributions of the p~arties, to the costs, 
redemption, taxes, interest and incidental. expenses. No 
request for partition was made and the court entered 
judgment ag-ainst the Plaintiff for costs. Upon appeal 
the Supreme C'Ourl of Kansas said: 
''From the foregoing facts if will·be seen that 
the legal rights of the parties to the action have 
been adjudged to remain in complicated, chaotic 
confusion. The Plaintiffs do not know whethe·r 
they have right to remain in possession of the 
house; the Defendant, Hugh Taylor, does not 
know whether he has title to all the land as 
against the claims of th·e Plaintiffs; no one knows 
who should pay taxes on all or any part 'Of the 
property .. The Plaintiffs do not know whether 
Hugh Taylor owes them money; whether it is a 
lien upon the land, or whether they can hereafter 
obtain a judgment for the eorrect amount. Thus, 
the means to the legal end ended meaningless. 
Moreover, serious legal complications may arise 
if the respective parties attem~pt to seek an ad-
judication of their resp·ective rights in subsequent 
independent litigation. The law relative to avoid-
ing a multiplicity of actions an·d- res judicata may 
plague the parties in any actions which they may 
see fit to bring in furtherance of the establish-
ment of their legal rights. We do not pass upon 
such questions because they are not befor:e us for 
decision in this appeal. 
''This court is well a ware that the trial court 
was confronted with p;erplexing problems concern-
ing the application of the .statute of frauds, the 
effect of part perfo:rmance, possession, and par-
tial payment thereunder, the sufficiency of writ-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
ten memoranda, the limitations of the pleadings, 
the possible insufficiency of the testimony, and 
other complications. Nevertheless, we are con-
vinced that the result reached by the trial court 
was wrong. The applicable and controlling rule 
is that equity will not enter a p:artial or incom-
plete decree. From 19 Am. Jur. 12:6-127 the fol-
lowing is quoted : 
' ' 'The rule is that equity will not enter a par-
tial or incomplete decree. Having taken cogni-
zance of a cause for any purpose, a court of equity 
will ordinarily retain jurisdiction for all pur-
poses; decide all issues which are involved by the 
subject matter of the diS'prute between the liti-
gants; award relief which is .complete and finally 
disposes of litigation so as to make performance 
of the -court's decree perfectly safe to those who 
may be compelled to 'Obey it; accomplish full 
justice between the parties litigant; and prevent 
future litigation.' 
"L-ater in the text will be found the following 
from Section 409, page 281: 
" 'It is a fundamental principle of chancery 
, courts finally to dispose of litigation, making as 
c10mplete a decision ·on all the points embraced in 
a cause as the nature of the case will admit, so 'to 
preclude not only all furthe·r litigations between 
the same parties, but also the possibility that the 
parties may at any future :period be disturbed or 
harassed by the claim of any other person, as well 
as the possibility 'Of any danger of injustice being 
done to other p·ersons who are not before the 
court in the p~resent proceedings. Acting pursuant 
to this principle, courts of equity require not only 
that the pleadings shall S'O p·resent all the rna tters 
in controversy that they may be properly adjudi-
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cated, but also, that so far as p·racti,cable, all p,e·r-
sons having any interest in the subject matter of 
controversy be made parties to the end that their 
rights may be ascertained.' 
"The text continues: 
'' '* * * A final decree which undertakes to 
dispose of the ~whole cause should include a dispo-
sition of issues which are raised by a cross hill 
and answer as well as those which are p~resented 
by the pleadings in chief. 
'' 'Whe're several parties, being all those in-
terested in a legal controversy, are before the 
court asking that their respective rights he de-
termined, and such rights are capable of ascertain-
ment, a decree, based upon indefinite findings, 
which does not determine the essential rights of 
all the parties and leaves a material part of the 
controversy undetermined, is insufficient and will 
not be upheld on appeal.' ('S. 409, p. 282.) 
"Equity maxims support the rule. One of 
them is that 'Equity delights to do justice and not 
by halves.' Another is that 'equity will not suffer 
a wrong to be without a remedy.' See' C.J.S:., 
Equity, 104 and 105, p. 506. The rule which we 
think controlling this ca.se is stated and will he 
found supported by nearly four pages of cita-
tions in 30 C.J.S., Equity, 67, beginning at p~age 
414." 
When the case was again before the Sup·erior Court, 
the Court misinterpreted the opinion of the Supreme 
C~ourt of Kansas and ordered the 30 acres to be appraised 
and if neither party ·elected to take it at the appraised 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
value, it should he sold and the pro:cee'ds paid as set out 
in the opinion. 
Upon appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas held 
that since there ·was no dispute as to the title to the North 
15 acres, it was error to 'order the sale of the e;ntire 30 
acre tract. See 199 P. (2') 529. 
Again when the case was r·emanded to the Superior 
Court, that Court drew the following conclusions: 
III. "In view, however, of the finding and judg-
ment of the Supreme Court as expressed in next 
to the last paragraph of its opinion in the case of 
Hultz v. Taylor, 166 Kan. 55 (199 P. 2d 529), that 
the defendant Taylor is the owner of the North 
Fifteen Acres of the Thirty Acre Tract in ques-
tion, and that the plaintiff, Hultz, has no interest 
therein because of the allegations in his petitio;, 
equity, unde·r the Conclusion of Fact in this case, 
and the Mandate of the Supreme Court, will 
award the title to the South Fifteen Acres of the 
Tliirty Acre ·Tract to the parties who contributed 
to the redemption of the whole 'Thirty Acre 
Tract." 
IV. "Equity will, in this action, de:cree a divi-
sion of the South Fifteen Acres of the Thirty Acre 
Tract among the parties who contributed to the 
redemption thereof, from the foreclosure sale, if 
either of the parties move for such a division 
within sixty days from the entry of the judgment 
herein.'' 
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Again the case was appealed to the Supreme 'Court, 
and that Court referring to the conclusions of the Court 
set out above, said: 
'' vV e set aside conclusions of law Nos. III and 
I'7 as not being in accord with the trial court's 
judgment. 
''In lief thereof the court should find the 
fractional share of the thirty -acre tract of land 
owned by Caleb Hultz and the fractional share 
owned by Hugh Taylor. Whether that is done by 
permitting and requiring Hultz· to pay Taylor a 
sum which the court shall find will make each of 
the parties the owner of an undivided one-half of 
the land, or whether such respective shares are 
determined by the am·ount each has p~aid to re-
deem the land plus taxes and other itenis, if any, 
which should be taken into account, is for the trial 
court to determine under all the facts and circum-
stances in the case.'' 
In Conley v. Sharp.e, supra, Plaintiffs commenced an 
action to set aside certain deeds and quiet title to the 
real estate in question in Plaintiffs. The Defendant's 
answer set up an undivided one-half interest in D·efend-
ant. The District Court held that the Plaintiffs an·d the 
Defendant owned the real estate as tenants in common, 
and found that the Defendant had made ce:rtain payments 
of principal and interest due on a mortgage, had p·aid the 
taxes on the property, and had p•aid for material and 
labor repairing and preserving said real property. Upon 
appeal, addressing itself to the question of whether a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
co-tenant sh·ould be reimbursed for such expenditures, 
the Appellate Court said: 
''The rule is that when one tenant in common 
, has ·paid a debt or obligation for the benefit of the 
joint property, or has discharged a lien or assess-
ment imposed upon it as a common burden, he is 
entitled as a matter of right to have his co-tenant, 
who has received the benefit of it, refund to him 
his proportionate share of the amount paid. As a 
matter of fact this property was joint p·roperty 
when these taxes and other charges against it were 
paid by plaintiff. In proportion to their interest 
all tenants in common are in duty bound to pay 
taxes, which in thi.s state are a lien upon real 
property and their nonpayment subjects the land 
to sale in satisfaction of them. Either of the co-
tenants may pay the taxes assessed against the 
whole estate, and such payment discharges the 
·lien imposed upon the common interest, and no 
matter whether one tenant p'aying it intended the 
payment to be f·or his own benefit or not, such 
payment in fact and in law essentially insures to 
the benefit of the other co-tenants. It discharges 
the lien against the common estate for the common 
benefit, independent of any intention of the co-
ten_ant paying it, and as all other co-tenants are 
entitled to the benefit of such payment, it is only 
right that they should refund to the one making it 
their prO'portion of the amount he has paid. 
Starks v. Kirchgarber, 134 Mo. Ap·p. 211, 11'3 S.W. 
1149. This rule equally applies to expenditures 
f . " other than taxes made for the common bene It. 
Willmon v. Koyer, 1'68 Cal. 369, 374, 143 P. 694, 
. 6916, L.R.A. 1915 B, 961. See also, Rich v. Smith, 
26 Cal. App·. 775, 784, 148 P. 545; J a1nison v. C·ot-
ton, 136 Cal. App. 127, 129, 28 p·. 2d 39. 
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Respondents admit they have ''been unable to 
find any authority holding the co-tenant p~erson­
ally liable for the expenses incurred by the other 
co-tenant and, theref·ore, (have) no objection to 
the modification of the judgment entered in the 
above-entitled action so that the judgment only 
constitute a lien on the real property and not a 
personal judgment against the plaintiffs and 
cross-defendants.'' 
In the Strausburg v. Conrnor, supra, action was 
brought to quiet title to certain real estate. The court 
found that the Plaintiff was the owner of an undivided 
three-fourths interest and the Defendant the owner of an 
undivided one-fourth interest and the eourt also found 
I 
that the Defendant owed to Strausburg, one of the 
Plaintiffs, a balance due on the ~purchase price of the 
Defendant's one-fourth interest and entered a judgment 
accordingly. Referring to this phase of the case, the 
Appellate Court held: 
"Little need be said about the ap·peal from 
the part of the judgment ·wherein it is decreed 
that respondent Mike Strausburg recover of ap·-
pellant the sum of $20. This was, upon sufficient 
evidence, held by the court to have been the un-
paid part ·of the purchase pric·e which appellant 
had agreed to pay .for the Strausburg interest. 
Appellant by appropriate affirmative alle·gations 
had sought a decre·e quieting her title against the 
·Strausburgs, basing her claim entirely on their 
deed to her. Therefore the trial court was justi-
fied, while granting her the equitable relief she 
asked in ordering her to do equity by paying her 
debt." 
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It will be recalled that the Plaintiff commenced this 
action to quiet title to a one-half undivided interest in the 
mining claims in question; that the Defandant 's answer 
alleged that he owned the mining claims, and. was entitled 
to the possession thereof; that during the trial the evi-
dence showed conclusively that the Defendant's contri-
bution toward the purchase price of said mining claims 
was $15,750.00, and that_ the Plaintiff's contribution was 
$·2,000.00 ; that there is now a mortgage against said min-
ing claims in favor of W. H. Balsley given to secure the 
balance of the purchase price due. It will also be recalled 
that the Defendant's motion to amend the Findings of 
Fact, ·Con;clusions of Law and Decree requested the court 
to quiet title in the Plaintiff and Defendant according 
to their respective contributions, .or to quiet title to an 
undivided one-half interest in the Plaintiff and impose 
a lien on said mining claims in favor of .the D·efendant 
to secure the amount owing from Plaintiff to Defendant; 
and that the court determine and adjust all equities be-
tween the parties and determine all controversial claims 
to the properties, and that said motion was denied. 
We respectfully sub-mit that under the authorities 
ab-ove cited, the District Court erred in failing to deter-
mine what right, title and interest the Defendant had in 
said mining claims; in failing to determine the respective 
contributions toward the purchase pri_ce and improve-
ments of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and in failing 
to impose a lien in favor of Defendant to secure the 
amount of the contribution due from Plaintiff, and in 
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failing to determine 'vhether the Plaintiff and Defend-
ant, or both of them, should pay to H. W. Balsley the 
balance due on the present existing note and mortgage. 
The absolute necessity of the Cuu.rt to completely 
detennine all of the issues in the case becomes of the 
greatest importance, if it is kept in mind that the Court's 
failure to decide the issues involved in the case p~reelude 
all partie&from thereafter predicating a cause of action 
upon an undecided issue because the judgment is res 
adjudicata, not only ~as to the issues determined by the 
Court, but as to all issues which should have been deter-
mined by the Court. The rule is thus stated in 44 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence at Page 9-5: 
''Generally, where jurisdictional requisites 
are satisfied, the judgment or decree is conclu-
sive as to the rights of the parties and their 
privies \vith respect to all matters in issue which 
were or should have been determined, in the action 
or proceeding, ~and, under the rule of res adjudi-
cata, bars subsequent litigation between such. per-
sons based on the same claim or cause of action. To 
a determination 'Of ~all interests, in addition to 
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject 
matter of the action, it is necessary to the validity 
and binding effect of a judgment or decree that 
the court should have had jurisdiction of the ques-
tion which it assumes to decide, or the ~particular 
remedy or relief which it assumes to grant, but 
if all the parties are brought before the court that 
can be brought before it, and it acts properly ac-
cording to the rights that ap~pear, there being no 
fraud or collusion, its decision-is c.onclusive as to 
to the state of the title." 
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See also, Hultz v. Taylor, supra, and C:onley v. 
Sharpe, supra, when the court recognized the rule that 
one co-tenant cannot recover a personal judgment against 
the other tenant for taxes paid, improvements made or 
discharging a superior encumbrance. Unless this case 
.is reversed and p1aintiff is required to do equity and a 
lien impressed to protect the Defendant, the Defendant 
may he without a remedy and Plaintiff unjustly enriched. 
·see also Logam ~City v. Utah Pow·er and Light Com-
pany, 16 P. (2) 1097, 1101 where this Court held that a 
judgment is conclusive as to all matters which might 
have been interposed as a defense. An affirmance of the 
District Court's decision would ·prevent the Defendant 
from seeking relief against the Plaintiff fo! the an1ount 
owing from Plaintiff to Defendant in another action. 
The necessity and advisability of the Court to com-
pletely decide all of the issues in this case and to enter a 
Decree which will fully and completely protect all of 
the rights and equities of all of the parties concerned is 
unmistakably demonstrated by the fact that on the 8th 
of August, 1950, there was recorded in the office of the 
San Juan County Recorder a deed conveying all of the 
Plaintiff's interests in the mining claims described in the 
Plaintiff's Complaint to Alvin J. Kinder. 
Referring now to the Defendant's second assignment 
of error, namely, that the C·ourt 's Findings of Fact 
should not have included a finding that the Defendant 
had agreed to transfer his interest in said mining claims 
to a corporation to be organized, we desire to point out 
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to the Court that such a finding is wholly without any 
of the issues raised by the pleadings in this case, and 
wholly unnecessary to an adjudication of the respective 
rights of the Plaintiff and the Defendant in said mining 
claims, and should be deleted from the Court's Findings 
of Fact. 
· We respectfully submit that the decision of the 
District ·Court should be reversed and remanded to the 
District Court with instructions to determine all of the 
issues raised by the pleadings and to enter Findin~gs of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree adjudicating the 
rights of the Defendant to an undivided one-half interest 
in said mining claims; determining the contributions 
of the Plantiff and the Defendant toward the purchase 
price of said mining claims and the improvements made 
thereon, and impressing a lien in favor of the Defendant 
to secure the indebtedness owing to him from the Plain-
tiff and to determine the respective rights, liabilities and 
obligations of the Plaintiff and the Defendant in re-
gards to the mortgage indebtedness in favor of H. W. 
Balsley. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EMERS·ON C. WILLEY 
WESLEY G. HO·WELL 
·Suite 1003-07 Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Atvorneys for D~efendant 
&i A·ppell~ants 
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